The Modernization of Turkey’s Customs Union with the
European Union: Reasons and Possible Outcomes. EU Diplomacy Paper 09/2017 by Alkan, Ufuk
DEPARTMENT OF EU INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY STUDIES
The Modernization of Turkey’s 
Customs Union with the 
European Union: Reasons and 
Possible Outcomes
Ufuk Alkan
EU Diplomacy Paper 09 / 2017
 
 
 
Department of EU International Relations 
and Diplomacy Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
EU Diplomacy Papers 
9/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
The Modernization of Turkey’s Customs Union 
with the European Union:  
Reasons and Possible Outcomes 
 
 
Ufuk Alkan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Ufuk Alkan 
 
 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail info.ird@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird 
EU Diplomacy Paper 9/2017 
2 
About the Author 
Ufuk Alkan is an alumnus of the College of Europe with an MA in EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies. Previously, he obtained an MA in EU Politics and 
International Relations from Marmara University and a BA in International Relations 
from Istanbul University in Turkey. He is a PhD candidate at the International Relations 
Department of Ankara University. Currently, he is working as an EU expert at the Turkish 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock. His research interests are the 
Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy and EU-Turkey trade relations in the Customs 
Union period. This paper is based on his Master’s thesis at the College of Europe 
(Keynes Promotion) and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Turkish Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture and Livestock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Team: 
Giorgio Bassotti, Bram De Botselier, Tommaso Emiliani, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Aurore Loste, 
Sofia López Piqueres, Simon Schunz, Aleksandra Tor 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail ird.info@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
Views expressed in the EU Diplomacy Papers are those of the authors only and do not 
necessarily reflect positions of either the series editors or the College of Europe.  
  
Ufuk Alkan 
3 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to explain why, in May 2015, the European Union (EU) and Turkey have 
chosen to modernize their Customs Union instead of directly completing Turkey’s 
accession process, how they will most likely do so, and the implications thereof for 
Turkish EU membership. I argue that Turkey and the EU seek to modernize the Customs 
Union because of the EU’s increased quest for bilateral free trade agreements after 
the failure to conclude the Doha Development Round, the flawed implementation of 
the institutional provisions of the 1963 Ankara Agreement, and the stalemate in EU 
accession negotiations. The Customs Union is likely to be modernized by liberalizing 
agriculture, services and public procurement and by improving the implementation 
of the 1963 Ankara Agreement. The modernized Customs Union will most probably be 
the institutional basis for EU-Turkey relations in the near future. However, in a better 
future conjuncture of bilateral relations, it may then serve as a further step for Turkey’s 
accession to the EU. 
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Introduction  
Association and accession are two parallel processes in the bilateral relations between 
the EU and Turkey. Association started when the Ankara Agreement was signed on 12 
September 1963, while the accession negotiations started on 3 October 2005.1 Both 
processes have culminated in a considerable level of approximation of Turkish laws 
with EU legislation. Initially, association was seen as a further step towards accession 
and, therefore, it was designed as an asymmetrical arrangement.2 These asymmetries 
have become more evident since the accession negotiations have not progressed 
smoothly.3 To remedy these shortcomings of the Customs Union and to extend its 
substance, Turkey and the EU have on 12 May 2015 declared their intention to 
modernize it.4 
The idea of modernizing the Customs Union has in particular gained impetus 
after the World Bank issued its report “Evaluation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union” on 
28 March 2014, which was financed by the European Commission.5 One month before 
the report was issued, Turkey and the EU established a Senior Official Working Group 
on the Update of the EU-Turkey Customs Union and Trade Relations (SOWG) on 28 
February 2014, following a meeting between the Commissioner for Trade and the 
Turkish Minister of Economy. 6  The SOWG held several meetings to discuss the 
modernization and issued a report on 27 April 2015, highlighting three pillars for the 
future modernization:7 the first pillar concerns a better implementation and/or an 
amendment of the Customs Union Decision 1/95; the second pillar is the extension of 
the Customs Union to new areas like agriculture, services and public procurement; and 
the third pillar deals with the improvement of the institutional structure.  
Another meeting between the Commissioner for Trade and the Turkish Minister 
of Economy was held on 12 May 2015 after which it was announced that Turkey and 
                                                 
1 Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community and 
Turkey of 12 September 1963, Official Journal of the European Union, L 361/1, 29 December 
1964, [hereafter, “Ankara Agreement”]. 
2 Interview with Nicola Danti, MEP (S&D) and Substitute Member of INTA Committee, via email, 
4 April 2017.  
3 Ibid.; Interview with Michele Villani, Principal Administrator on Turkey and Trade, DG NEAR, 
European Commission, Brussels, 28 March 2017. 
4 European Commission, “EU and Turkey Announce Modernisation of Custom Union”, Brussels, 
12 May 2015. 
5 World Bank, “World Bank Group Report: EU-Turkey Customs Union Boosts Trade, But Needs 
Strengthening”, Istanbul, 8 April 2014. 
6 Report of the Senior Officials Working Group on the Update of the EU-Turkey Customs Union 
and Trade Relations, 27 April 2015, p. 2, [hereafter, “SOWG Report”]. 
7 Ibid., pp. 2-4. 
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the EU would seek negotiating mandates for the modernization.8 Moreover, the EU 
adopted a new trade strategy “Trade for All” in October 2015 where it stated that 
as it currently stands, the customs union covers only industrial goods and lacks 
a mechanism for settling disputes. A modernized customs union should release 
the untapped economic potential of areas like services, agriculture and 
government procurement. A reformed customs union could also pave the way 
for associating Turkey with future EU FTAs [free trade agreements].9 
The Office of the Prime Minister of Turkey issued the 65th Government Programme in 
May 2016 where it lists the modernization as an objective, in addition to EU 
membership. 10  Moreover, in the Medium Term Fiscal Plan (2017-2019), the 
intensification of trade integration with the EU and the elimination of the shortcomings 
of the Customs Union through the modernization are mentioned.11 Lastly, the EU-Turkey 
Statement of 18 March 2016 “welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the 
Customs Union”.12  
The European Commission adopted draft negotiating directives on 21 
December 2016. Negotiations will start when the Foreign Affairs Council adopts the 
mandate. Currently, trade-related aspects of the modernization are discussed in the 
Trade Policy Committee and political aspects are discussed in the Working Party on 
Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession (COELA). 13  Meanwhile, the 
European Parliament’s Committee of International Trade (INTA) adopted a draft 
report in January 2017.14 Politically sensitive issues may not be resolved at COELA and 
they may be taken to the Committee of Permanent Representatives or the Council of 
the EU. No member state opposed the adoption of the mandate by the Council of 
the EU until recently.15 However, the continuing row between Germany and Turkey 
                                                 
8 European Commission, “EU and Turkey Announce Modernisation of Custom Union”, op.cit. 
9  European Commission, Trade for All: Towards a more Responsible Trade and Investment 
Policy, COM(2015) 497 final, Brussels, 14 October 2015, p. 34. 
10 Office of the Prime Minister of Turkey, 65. Hükümet Programı, Ankara, 24 May 2016, p. 126. 
11 Ministry of Development of Turkey, 2017-2019 Orta Vadeli Plan. 
12 EU-Turkey Statement, Brussels, 18 March 2016, par. 7.  
13 Interview with a Counsellor from the Permanent Representation of a member state to the EU, 
Brussels, 5 April 2017. 
14 European Parliament, Committee on International Trade, David Borrelli (rapporteur), Draft 
Report on ‘Towards a New Trade Framework between the European Union and Turkey and the 
Modernisation of the Customs Union, 2016/2031(INI), Brussels, 10 January 2017. 
15 Interview with a Counsellor from the Permanent Representation of a member state to the EU, 
op.cit. 
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may complicate the adoption of the mandate.16 Most of the member states favour 
the adoption of the mandate as long as it includes their concerns.17 Once adopted, 
the negotiations for the modernization may last at least until 2020.18  
This paper aims to explain why the EU and Turkey have recently chosen to focus 
on further trade integration instead of directly completing the accession process, how 
they intend to proceed, and the implications thereof for the accession negotiations. 
First, it is argued that Turkey and the EU seek a modernization of the Customs Union 
because of the EU’s quest for bilateral free trade agreements with more, and more 
important, partners after the failure to conclude the Doha Development Round in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Other reasons to modernize the Customs Union are 
the flawed implementation of the institutional provisions of the Ankara Agreement and 
the stalemate in Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU. Second, Turkey and the 
EU plan to modernize the Customs Union by liberalizing agriculture, services and public 
procurement and by improving the implementation of the Ankara Agreement. Third, 
the modernized Customs Union will most probably remain the institutional basis for EU-
Turkey relations in the near future. However, when their relations improve again, the 
upgraded Customs Union could serve as a further step for Turkey’s accession to the 
EU. 
In the following sections, economic, institutional and political reasons for the 
modernization will be evaluated. Then, institutional and substantial aspects of the 
modernization will be discussed. Finally, the likely implications of the modernization for 
the accession negotiations will be discussed. The modernization of the Customs Union 
is an interesting case given the fact that Turkey is simultaneously negotiating 
accession. Many institutional and substantial aspects of the modernization could be 
achieved by immediately completing the accession process. Yet, Turkey and the EU 
opted for the modernization. In addition to documents and secondary literature, 
interviews with officials from both sides help to understand their expectations 
regarding a modernization and their views of the relationship between association 
and accession.  
                                                 
16 Ç. Özdemir, “AB’nin Gümrük Birliği Tehdidi Ne Kadar Gerçekçi?”, Deutsche Welle, 9 August 
2017. 
17 Interview with a Counsellor from the Permanent Representation of a member state to the EU, 
op.cit. 
18 S. Doveri-Vesterbye & M.S. Akman, “Introduction and Background”, in S. Doveri-Vesterbye & 
M.S. Akman (eds.), A Modernized Customs Union: Expert Interviews and Analysis, Brussels, 
European Neighbourhood Council, 2017, p. 5. 
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The Reasons for the Modernization 
This section sets out the reasons why Turkey and the EU are modernizing the Customs 
Union despite the continuing accession negotiations.  
Economic and Political Reasons 
Turkey and the EU expected economic benefits from establishing the Customs Union 
which is limited to industrial products and industrial components of processed 
agricultural products.19 Today, Turkey is the fifth largest trading partner of the EU and 
the EU is Turkey’s biggest trading partner.20 The EU accounts for an average of 44% of 
Turkey’s total exports and an average of 37.5% of total imports since 2010.21 The top 
five export destinations for Turkey are Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France and 
Spain.22 Although the Customs Union does not cover investments, Turkey has bilateral 
investment agreements with 26 member states.23 Hence, in 2015, almost 57.6% of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to Turkey came from the EU.24  
Developments in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy have considerably 
influenced the Turkish economy because of the increased trade integration between 
Turkey and the EU. The Common Commercial Policy has changed significantly after 
the establishment of the Customs Union, creating challenges for Turkey. For instance, 
Decision 1/95 stated that Turkey had to comply with EU preferential trade regimes, that 
is, conclude FTAs with the EU’s FTA partners and align with the EU’s autonomous trade 
regimes, such as the Generalized System of Preferences, until 2001.25 However, in the 
face of the failure to conclude the Doha Round and after some of the ‘Singapore 
issues’ (government procurement, competition policy and investments) were 
                                                 
19 EU-Turkey Association Council, “Decision 1/95 of 22 December 1995 on Implementing the 
Final Phase of the Customs Union (96/142/EC)”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 035, 
13 February 1996. 
20 European Commission, “European Union, Trade in Goods with Turkey”, Brussels, 17 February 
2017, p. 2. 
21 World Trade Organization, Turkey Trade Policy Review, WT/TPR/S/331, Geneva, 9 February 
2016, p. 21. 
22 K. Binder, Reinvigorating EU-Turkey Bilateral Trade: Upgrading the Customs Union, Briefing, 
European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 599.319, Brussels, March 2017, p. 3. 
23  European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the Document Recommendation for a Council Decision Authorising the 
Opening of Negotiations with Turkey on an Agreement on the Extension of the Scope of the 
Bilateral Preferential Trade Relationship and on the Modernisation of the Customs Union, 
SWD(2016) 475 final, Brussels, 21 December 2016, p. 9 [hereafter, “European Commission 
Impact Assessment”]. 
24 Binder, op.cit., p. 3. 
25 EU-Turkey Association Council, “Decision 1/95”, op.cit. 
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dropped from the agenda at the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference, the EU started 
to conclude deep and comprehensive FTAs in line with its 2006 Global Europe 
Strategy.26 These changes in the Common Commercial Policy have created certain 
challenges for Turkey given its lack of participation in EU decision-making. For instance, 
Turkey has had difficulties concluding FTAs with the EU’s FTA partners.27 
Given that Turkey applies the Common External Tariff (CET) of the EU for 
industrial products and the fact that rules of origin do not apply in a Customs Union, all 
FTAs concluded by the EU provide direct access to the Turkish market via trade 
deflection through the EU. Their access to the Turkish market is not reciprocal until 
Turkey concludes a similar agreement with these countries. Thus, when the EU 
concludes an FTA, Turkey eliminates all of its tariffs for industrial products towards that 
country. However, the FTA partners of the EU keep applying the tariffs until they 
conclude an FTA with Turkey. The potential of trade deflection via the EU’s internal 
market to the Turkish market is especially important for the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). If TTIP was implemented, industrial products from the 
United States would have free access to the Turkish market via trade deflection, yet 
without reciprocity for Turkish goods on the US market.28 In addition, Turkish products 
would have to compete with US products on the EU market.29 Therefore, Turkey seeks 
to negotiate its own FTA with the US.30 Another option would have been to allow the 
accession of countries like Turkey, Mexico and Canada to TTIP.31 However, accession 
to TTIP or a separate FTA with the USA would imply that Turkey has to undertake a 
higher level of trade integration in areas such as agriculture, services and public 
procurement.32 Alignment with the relevant EU acquis and horizontal rules through the 
                                                 
26  European Commission, Global Europe: Competing in the World, COM(2006) 567 final, 
Brussels, 4 October 2006, p. 6. 
27 Interview with Murat Yapıcı, Director General for EU Affairs, Ministry of Economy of Turkey, via 
email, 27 March 2017.  
28 E. Yalcin, R. Aichele & G.J. Felbermayr, Turkey’s EU Integration at a Crossroads (GED Study), 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, April 2016, p. 12. 
29  G.J. Felbermayr & M. Larch, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): 
Potentials, Problems and Perspectives”, CESifo Forum, vol. 14, no. 2, 2013, pp. 49-60. 
30 M. Yapıcı, Director General for EU Affairs, Ministry of Economy of Turkey, “Turkish Perspective 
on FTAs under the Turkey-EU Customs Union with a Special Focus on TTIP”, presentation, Brussels, 
INTA Committee, 18 June 2013. 
31  S. Akman, “AB-ABD Transatlantik Ticaret ve Yatırım Ortaklığı: Türkiye Açısından Bir 
Değerlendirme”, Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi, vol. 13, no. 1, 2014, p. 20. 
32  Interview with Balázs Kiss, Policy Coordinator for Trade Relations with Turkey, DG Trade, 
European Commission, Brussels, 5 April 2017. 
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modernization may facilitate Turkey’s accession to TTIP or the conclusion of an FTA with 
the USA.33  
The unfulfilled trade potential of a Customs Union which is limited in substance 
is another economic reason for the modernization.34 However, the liberalization of 
services and agriculture cannot be negotiated under the accession negotiations 
given that the Council of the EU decided in December 2006 to suspend accession 
negotiations on eight chapters of the EU acquis until Turkey applies the Customs Union 
equally to all member states, including to Cyprus.35 This is a politically sensitive issue. 
Due to the lack of credibility of the accession process and the decreased legitimacy 
of EU demands, recognition by Turkey of the Republic of Cyprus would be politically 
costly and hard to justify for the Turkish government. Turkey supported the Annan Plan 
for the unification of Cyprus in 2004 when accession was a realistic objective. 
Therefore, because of the 2006 Decision of the Council of the EU which applies to 
services and agriculture but not to public procurement, Turkey and the EU decided to 
negotiate the liberalization of services and agriculture within the framework of the 
modernization. The liberalization of public procurement could be negotiated under 
the accession talks, but this is challenging for Turkey.36  
Moreover, the EU mentioned the possibility of “long transitional periods, 
derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses” regarding the 
free movement of persons, structural policies or agricultural funds if Turkey acceded 
to the EU.37 These proposals would curtail Turkey’s expected membership benefits and 
have thus further reduced the credibility of accession. The modernization will not 
entitle Turkey to benefit from the Common Agricultural Policy funds or the free 
movement of persons, but it may facilitate the free movement of workers through the 
liberalization of services.  
The employment of trade defence measures like anti-dumping, safeguards and 
countervailing duties in bilateral trade in line with article 44 of Decision 1/95 is another 
                                                 
33 Interview with Kim Jørgensen, Permanent Representative of Denmark to the EU and former 
Ambassador to Turkey, Brussels, 5 April 2017.  
34 European Commission Impact Assessment, op.cit., p. 9. 
35  Council of the European Union, “2770th Council Meeting General Affairs and External 
Relations General Affairs”, Press Release, C/06/352, Brussels, 11 December 2006. 
36  K. Dawar & S. Togan, Bringing EU-Turkey Trade and Investment Relations up to Date, 
Workshop, European Parliament DG for External Policies, PE. 535.014, Brussels, May 2016, pp. 38-
39. 
37 Council of the European Union, Negotiating Framework Document, Luxembourg, 3 October 
2005, par. 12. 
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economic reason. 38  Nonetheless, the Association Council may suspend their 
application entirely when it concludes that Turkey has implemented internal market-
related aspects of competition, state aid control and other relevant parts of EU acquis 
“and ensured their effective enforcement”.39  
Lastly, transportation quotas, transit visas and motor vehicle taxes imposed by 
some member states on Turkish trucks impede the free movement of goods and 
create additional expenses for exporters.40 This is an important issue given that  40% of 
Turkey’s trade is transported over land.41 However, these quotas, visas and taxes are 
considered to be prerogatives of member states and they do not want to renounce 
them.42 The EU and Turkey have different views regarding the nature of this issue. 
According to Turkey, they are unfair, because they impair the free movement of goods 
within the Customs Union.43 Yet, in the view of some member states, they relate to “the 
service of cross-border road haulage” which is a member-state competence not 
covered by the Customs Union and they are “imposed on the means of transport, not 
on the goods themselves being transported by the latter”.44 
Turkey needs to transpose the EU acquis in its entirety in the accession process 
while the modernization does not require an entire transposition.45 Turkey may not be 
willing to accept all the costs of entirely adopting the EU acquis in the accession 
negotiations which “are an open-ended process” and “the outcome of which cannot 
be guaranteed beforehand”.46  
Institutional Reasons 
In addition to the economic and political reasons elaborated above, there are several 
institutional shortcomings of the Customs Union that will be tackled through the 
modernization. First, decision-making in the Association Council is cumbersome 
                                                 
38 EU-Turkey Association Council, “Decision 1/95”, op.cit., art. 44. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Case C-65/16, Istanbul Lojistik Ltd v. Nemzeti Adó-és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatóság, 
2017, (not yet reported), Opinion of AG Øe Saugmandsgaard of 6 April 2017, par. 38. 
41 World Bank, Evaluation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union, Report no. 85830-TR, 28 March 2014, 
p. 50. 
42 Interview with Michele Villani, op.cit. 
43 Case C-65/16, op.cit., par. 73. 
44 Ibid., par. 72. 
45 Interview with a Counsellor from the Permanent Representation of a member state to the EU, 
op.cit.; Interview with Haluk Nuray, Brussels Representative, Economic Development 
Foundation, Brussels, 28 March 2017. 
46 Council of the European Union, Negotiating Framework Document, op.cit., par. 9. 
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because it meets only twice a year and its decisions are taken unanimously.47 Second, 
the association institutions provide a platform for an exchange of views. Turkey cannot 
influence EU decision-making through the current institutional structure, which makes 
it more difficult to align with the relevant EU acquis. Third, some institutional provisions 
of the Ankara Agreement are not implemented properly.  
The non-implementation of the consultation procedure is an important 
problem. Its operationalization is necessary to facilitate Turkey’s participation in 
decision-shaping and to ensure its alignment with the EU acquis. According to this 
procedure, the European Commission needs to informally consult experts from Turkey 
when it drafts a legislation “in an area of direct relevance to the operation of the 
Customs Union” and when it consults experts from member states.48 The areas of direct 
relevance are legislation in the fields of trade policy, technical barriers to trade, 
competition, intellectual property rights and customs.49 
In addition, the European Commission needs to communicate all the proposals 
in these areas to Turkey when “transmitting its proposal to the Council”.50 Before the 
Council of the EU adopts a decision, “the Parties shall, at the request of either of them, 
consult each other again within the Customs Union Joint Committee”. 51  A similar 
consultation procedure applies when Turkey drafts a proposal in an area of direct 
relevance to the functioning of the Customs Union. In such a case, Turkey needs to 
seek the views of the European Commission.52 Thus “the Turkish legislator may take his 
decision in full knowledge of the consequences for the functioning of the Customs 
Union”.53  
In addition to the consultation procedure, the European Commission needs to 
“ensure Turkish experts are involved as far as possible in the preparation of draft 
measures”. 54  These provisions are not implemented properly. The participation of 
Turkey in technical committees under the European Commission is set out in Decision 
                                                 
47 BKP Development Research & Consulting, Study of the EU-Turkey Bilateral Preferential Trade 
Framework, Including the Customs Union, and an Assessment of Its Possible Enhancement, 
European Commission DG Trade, Final Report, 26 October 2016, p. 148 [hereafter, “BKP Impact 
Assessment”]. 
48 EU-Turkey Association Council, “Decision 1/95”, op.cit., art. 55. 
49 Ibid., art. 54. 
50 Ibid., art. 55. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., art. 57. 
54 Ibid., art. 59. 
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1/95. 55  The list of these committees is in Annex 9. 56  It may be modified by the 
Association Council upon a recommendation by the Customs Union Joint 
Committee.57 For instance, the list was extended to the Textiles Committee in 1995 and 
to the Technical Regulations Committee in 1999.58 It has not been updated since then. 
As a result, Turkey cannot participate in some technical committees like the Trade 
Defence Instruments Committee, the Generalized Preferences Committee or the 
Committee on Trade Retaliation.  
The association relationship also lacks an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism. For instance, Turkey and the EU may take “any dispute relating to the 
application or interpretation of the [Ankara] Agreement” to the Association Council.59 
The dispute should concern the EU, a member state or Turkey. 60  Consequently, 
disputes concerning natural persons cannot be resolved at the Association Council.61 
The Association Council may settle a dispute by a unanimous decision or it may 
unanimously decide to refer it to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) or to other 
courts.62 In practice, it is difficult for the Association Council, which is composed of 
representatives of member state governments, of the Council of the EU and of the 
European Commission as well as members of the government of Turkey, to take a 
unanimous decision for the resolution of a dispute.63 It is even more difficult to decide 
unanimously in order to refer a dispute to the CJEU.64 The non-observance of EU case 
law by Turkish courts increases the need for an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism. If there was close cooperation between the Turkish courts and the CJEU, 
                                                 
55 Ibid., art. 60.  
56 Committee on Nomenclature, Customs Code Committee, Committee on External Trade 
Statistics. 
57 EU-Turkey Association Council, “Decision 1/95”, op.cit., art. 60. 
58 EU-Turkey Association Council, “Decision No. 6/95 of 22 December 1995 on Extending the List 
of Committees Referred to in Annex 9 to Decision No 1/95 of the EU-Turkey Association Council 
(96/146/EC)”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 035, 13 February 1996; EU-Turkey 
Association Council, “Decision No 2/1999 of 8 March 1999 Concerning the Extension of the List 
of Committees Referred to in Annex 9 to Decision No 1/95 on Implementing the Final Phase of 
The Customs Union (1999/208/EC)”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 072 , 18 March 
1999.  
59 Ankara Agreement, op. cit., art. 25. 
60 Ibid. 
61 E. Göral & M. Dartan, “The Customs Union in the Context of EU-Turkey Relations: An Evaluation 
of Current Debates”, Marmara Journal of European Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, 2016, p. 15. 
62 Ankara Agreement, op.cit., art. 25. 
63 European Economic and Social Committee, Section for External Relations, Dimitris Dimitriadis 
(rapporteur), Enhancement of EU-Turkey Bilateral Trade Relations and Modernisation of the 
Customs Union, Opinion, REX/468, Brussels, 14 December 2016, par. 5.5. 
64 Göral & Dartan, op.cit., p. 15. 
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a dispute settlement mechanism would be less important, like in the case of the 
European Economic Area (EEA, see below). 
Overall, the most cited reasons for the modernization by the Turkish side are the 
asymmetric structure of the Customs Union and the transportation quotas. 65  The 
asymmetry is mainly evidenced by the fact that Turkey unilaterally needs to align with 
the Common Commercial Policy which results in trade deflection. This could be 
corrected by enabling Turkey’s participation in EU decision-shaping. The issue of 
transportation quotas is currently before the CJEU (see below). The most cited 
motivations for the EU are the liberalization of agriculture, services and public 
procurement and the introduction of an effective dispute settlement mechanism.66  
The next section deals with the question of how Turkey and the EU are most likely 
going to modernize the Customs Union. Given that negotiations have not started yet 
and limited information is available, the question of how they could or should 
modernize it is addressed as well. 
The Contents of the Modernization 
The institutional and substantial aspects of the modernization will be evaluated 
separately. However, the modernization of the substance without improving the 
institutional provisions may cause a perpetuation of the institutional problems. 
Institutional improvements are also crucial for a better redistribution of future 
economic benefits.  
Institutional Aspects 
The 1992 EEA Agreement between the EU and three member states of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) – Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland – may help draw 
some insights for the Customs Union’s institutional modernization. For instance, the 
European Commission should “informally seek advice from experts of the EFTA states 
in the same way as it seeks advice from experts of” member states of the EU when a 
proposal is drafted.67 This provision is implemented quite effectively.68 There is a similar 
                                                 
65 Interview with Faruk Kaymakçı, Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Turkey to the EU, 
Brussels, 16 March 2017; Interview with Murat Yapıcı, op.cit., Interview with Haluk Nuray, op.cit.; 
Interview with Dilek Aydın, EU Representative, TÜSİAD and TÜRKONFED, Brussels, 16 March 2017. 
66 Interview with Michele Villani, op.cit.; Interview with Balázs Kiss, op.cit. 
67 Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 1, 3 January 1994, art. 99, [hereafter, “EEA Agreement].  
68 Interview with Georges Baur, Assistant Secretary-General, EFTA Secretariat, Brussels, 31 March 
2017 
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non-implemented consultation procedure for Turkey. In addition, EEA EFTA states 
participate in the public consultation processes initiated by the European Commission 
before the adoption of a proposal.69 They can also communicate written comments 
after the European Commission adopted its proposal.70 Lastly, EEA EFTA states can 
“submit comments before the Council of the EU adopts a common position”.71 Thus, 
they play a role in decision-shaping.  
Regarding the participation of EEA EFTA states in the technical committees 
under the European Commission, “as wide a participation as possible […] in the 
preparatory stage of draft measures” is ensured.72 Accordingly, EEA EFTA states can 
participate in the expert meetings and committees of the European Commission  
alongside the member states of the EU.73 No voting is held in these meetings. The 
difference with the case of Turkey is that EEA EFTA states are allowed to participate in 
all committees under the European Commission as long as these committees are 
relevant for the EEA Agreement.74 There is no exhaustive list as provided in Annex 9 of 
Decision 1/95. Similar decision-shaping mechanisms should be operationalized for 
Turkey. Jørgensen stated that in his view all member states seem to agree that the 
quest of Turkey for a closer involvement in the Common Commercial Policy was fair.75 
The extension of the Customs Union may further necessitate Turkish participation in 
technical committees concerning agriculture, services and public procurement. 
Apart from that, the EEA Joint Committee has significant decision-making 
powers. When the EU adopts a legislation relevant for the functioning of the EEA 
Agreement, the EEA Joint Committee decides on the necessary amendments to the 
relevant Annex of the EEA Agreement “to guarantee the legal security and the 
homogeneity of the EEA”.76 If EU legislation is added to the Annex, it becomes EEA law. 
When the EU drafts a proposal, EEA EFTA states hold discussions within working groups, 
sub-committees and finally the EEA Joint Committee as to whether the concerned 
proposal is related to the EEA Agreement and which amendments are necessary for 
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the Annex.77 The Customs Union Joint Committee does not have such an authority. It 
was established in 1995 “to carry out exchange of views and information, formulate 
recommendations to the Association Council and deliver opinions”.78 Though limited, 
there are two decision-making functions of the Customs Union Joint Committee. One 
of these is when Turkey cannot align its external tariffs simultaneously with the CET. In 
this case, the Committee may decide “to grant a period of time for this to be 
undertaken”. 79  Another possibility for decision-making is when trade deflection 
happens because of differences between the Turkish legislation and the EU acquis or 
because of different levels of implementation.80 In such a case, the affected party 
may take immediate safeguard measures and notify them to the Committee which 
may unanimously decide to keep, amend or abolish these measures.81  
In the case of Turkey, the decision-making power is mainly bestowed upon the 
Association Council. This results in delays in the resolution of problems because the 
Association Council only meets twice a year and deals with issues at a technical level 
instead of at a political one.82 The non-observance of EU case law by the Turkish courts 
is another important issue. There is an exemplary practice in the EEA which could serve 
as a basis. The EFTA Court has to apply all the jurisdiction of the CJEU relevant for the 
EEA Agreement before and after entry into force of the EEA Agreement.83 In practice, 
the CJEU directly communicates all its relevant decisions to the EFTA Court.84 Given 
this procedure of “dialogue of courts”, there has been no need for the dispute 
settlement mechanism hitherto.85  
Regarding trade defence measures, their  use is not allowed for in the EEA 
Agreement. 86 As mentioned earlier, the Association Council may suspend them if 
Turkey sufficiently aligns with “internal market related aspects of competition, state aid 
control and other relevant parts of EU acquis”.87 Therefore, Turkey should sufficiently 
harmonize with the relevant EU acquis and ensure its effective implementation 
throughout the modernization negotiations.  
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Apart from the institutional shortcomings, Turkey and the EU aim at extending 
the substance of the Customs Union, remedy trade deflection and eliminate 
transportation quotas.  
Substantial Aspects 
There are three options to resolve trade deflection from the EU’s FTAs. First, the EU and 
Turkey may jointly negotiate FTAs with third countries.88 Second, the EU may negotiate 
an FTA for both Turkey and the EU.89 Third, the EU could ask its FTA partners to open 
their markets for Turkish goods until they conclude FTAs with Turkey.90 The last option 
seems the most feasible one. Substantial aspects may include horizontal issues as well. 
For instance, the Ankara Agreement or Decision 1/95 do not have provisions on 
sanitary and phytosanitary rules (SPS), sustainable development, geographical 
indications, energy and raw materials, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
capital movements or the protection of FDI. 
Turkey and the EU are expected to follow a selective approach in extending 
the Customs Union to agriculture, services and public procurement. For instance, 
agriculture will be liberalized by a bilateral FTA, and most probably, it will not 
encompass all agricultural products.91 In addition, there will not be a single market in 
services. 92  Only certain services regulated by EU regulations or directives may be 
liberalized and the free movement of workers may be negotiated under Mode 4 which 
“covers natural persons who are either service suppliers […] or who work for a service 
supplier and who are present in another [country] to supply a service”.93 A modernized 
Customs Union may have provisions similar to the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement or “include further concessions in certain areas of coverage”.94 Turkey 
may need transition periods for eliminating domestic price advantages, bidder 
eligibility restrictions, local production conditions and other exceptions.95  
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Regarding transportation quotas or transit visas, Turkey and the EU should first 
decide whether they relate to cross-border road haulage services or the free 
movement of goods. If these measures concern the cross-border road haulage 
services for which only member states are competent, they may be eliminated via 
bilateral agreements.96 If they are about the free movement of goods, they should be 
eliminated because of the Customs Union. The issue is before the CJEU due to a 
dispute between Hungary and Turkey about which the Hungarian Court requested a 
preliminary ruling on 18 January 2016.97 The Advocate General issued his opinion on 6 
April 2017, underlining that the motor vehicle tax increases costs and “the end prices 
of those goods”. 98  On the relationship between transport services and the free 
movement of goods, he argued that although Hungarian rules are mainly related to 
transport services, they may be considered to constitute charges having equivalent 
effect to a customs duty, “since the exercise of free movement of goods is necessarily 
linked to the carriage of those goods”. 99  If the CJEU adopts the opinion of the 
Advocate General, the elimination of transportation quotas, transit visas or motor 
vehicle taxes may be easier than expected.  
Certain benefits will accrue both to Turkey and the EU from the extension of the 
Customs Union. Yet, Turkey will incur higher adaptation costs than the EU. For instance, 
in addition to the elimination of agricultural tariffs, Turkey needs to align with EU rules 
on SPS. Under the current preferential regime, 20% of Turkish agricultural tariff lines are 
duty-free for the EU while 56.4% of EU agricultural tariff lines are duty-free for Turkey.100 
Thus, Turkey needs to liberalize more and  accept EU rules. The same holds true for 
services. In Turkey, there are more services that require citizenship as a prerequisite 
than in the EU, and Turkey will need to align with EU rules on the mutual recognition of 
qualifications. In public procurement, it is basically up to Turkey to eliminate all its 
restrictive measures.  
This is maybe why the extension of the Customs Union to new sectors is mostly 
articulated by the EU while Turkey refers to trade deflection and transportation quotas 
as the most outstanding reasons for the modernization. Turkey may liberalize these 
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sectors if the expected benefits of eliminating the aforementioned shortcomings and 
the extension are higher than the expected costs.  
Is Modernization a Permanent Alternative to or a Step towards Accession? 
The idea of a privileged partnership with Turkey was first elaborated in November 2002 
in a newspaper article. 101  A more concrete model was developed by politicians 
thereafter. For instance, a German parliamentarian presented a detailed proposal in 
2004. 102  It was then voiced by several member-state politicians on different 
occasions.103 According to this plan, the institutional relations between Turkey and the 
EU should be improved by taking inspiration from the institutions of the EEA.104 The 
Customs Union should, for example, be extended to services,  but not yet introduce 
the free movement of workers, only visa facilitation.105 Finally, Turkey’s membership “in 
European foreign, security and defence policy structures on an equal basis” should be 
ensured.106  
However, Turkey stated many times that it would not accept any alternative to 
accession.107 It may have viewed attempts  to intensify the Customs Union as reducing 
the probability of accession. Therefore, the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs stated that the 
modernization “should take place without creating an alternative path to Turkey’s EU 
membership”. 108 As a matter of fact, Turkey accepted to modernize the Customs 
Union only after the expected costs of maintaining an asymmetric and substantially 
limited Customs Union outnumbered its expected benefits, when the TTIP negotiations 
were launched.109  
Although Jørgensen argues that “the issue of a replacement was not raised at 
EU level”, he agrees that “Turkey may still fear the replacement of accession talks by 
the modernization”. 110  A modernized Customs Union will most probably be the 
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institutional basis for EU-Turkey relations in the near future. If the accession negotiations 
do not re-accelerate, the Customs Union will be the platform for ensuring strategic 
cooperation and increased trade integration.  
Another opinion is that the modernization may help place Turkey in one of the 
concentric circles in an EU of differentiated integration.111 The idea of differentiated 
integration was revived after the European Commission published the “White Paper 
on the Future of Europe” in March 2017 which makes some projections as to the future 
of the EU by 2025.112 In this model, “one or several coalitions of the willing emerge to 
work together in specific policy areas”.113 According to some experts, if Turkey follows 
an ambitious reform agenda, it could secure its place in one of the concentric 
circles.114  
However, there is no clear answer in official EU documents on the relationship 
between association and accession. Turkey’s association was designed to prepare 
the country for accession. However, although the Customs Union was established in 
1995, accession has not happened and it is not likely to happen soon.  
The modernization may facilitate the accession process in the longer term 
through the harmonization of laws.115 After the Customs Union will be modernized, 
Turkey will need less harmonization of laws if accession talks re-accelerate in the 
future.116 In addition, an official interviewed argued that increased economic benefits 
from the modernization may positively change the public opinion and thus improve 
the prospect of membership in the longer term.117 For an EEAS official interviewed, the 
failure to modernize the Customs Union may distance Turkey further from the EU. In his 
view, “the modernization is a small subset of everything that is negotiated under the 
accession negotiations” and therefore, if Turkey and the EU do not succeed in the 
modernization, the accession process will become more difficult.118  
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The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament called on the 
European Commission to include political conditionality on human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in a modernized Customs Union.119 Cyprus also wants to use 
the modernization as a political leverage vis-à-vis Turkey. According to an official, “it 
is paradoxical to consider the upgrade of the Customs Union without Turkey 
implementing the current Customs Union arrangement equally to Cyprus”.120 Cyprus 
has the power to place its own conditionality into the mandate because the 
modernization will be achieved via Association Council decisions or new protocols “as 
part and parcel of the [Ankara] Agreement”. 121  The Ankara Agreement is an 
association agreement and requires unanimity when the Council of the EU adopts the 
mandate.122 The implementation of a future agreement may depend on a unanimous 
decision by the Council of the EU and the consent of the European Parliament which 
is based on simple majority voting. Depending on the content, ratification by the 
parliaments of member states may also be necessary.123 Thus, the preferences of the 
European Parliament should be observed during the negotiations.124  
It is difficult to say whether the EU can convince Cyprus or like-minded member 
states not to include political conditionality in the mandate for the sake of the 
negotiations. According to Terzi, if Cyprus is convinced not to refer to the Cyprus issue 
and if the Customs Union is modernized successfully, the participation of Turkey in 
future EU decision-shaping alongside all member states, including Cyprus, may 
facilitate Turkey’s socialization with EU norms and values.125 Cyprus may accept not to 
block the modernization negotiations if it concludes, as Greece did in 1999, that 
engaging Turkey within the EU and thus facilitating Turkey’s socialization with EU norms 
and values may help resolve bilateral differences.126 Another, less likely option is the 
fulfilment by Turkey of the political conditionality regarding the Cyprus issue in the 
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mandate.127 If the mandate asks Turkey to apply the Customs Union equally to all 
member states including Cyprus, and if Turkey accepts this, the 2006 Decision of the 
Council of the EU on suspending the accession negotiations on eight chapters or 
individual vetoes by Cyprus on the opening of negotiations on other chapters would 
come to an end. 128  Therefore, Terzi concludes that both options would facilitate 
Turkey’s socialization with the EU and improve the prospect of accession in the 
future.129  
Conclusion 
This paper sought to explain why the EU and Turkey have chosen to modernize their 
Customs Union despite Turkey’s continuing accession process, how they are likely do 
so, and the implications thereof for Turkey’s EU membership.  
The economic reasons for the modernization are manifold. The failure to 
conclude the Doha Round and the trade deflection resulting from the increasing 
number of FTAs concluded by the EU, and in particular the TTIP negotiations, have 
been influential. In this respect, TTIP negotiations and the possibility of trade deflection 
are particularly important. Also, the unfulfilled trade potential has pushed Turkey and 
the EU to consider liberalizing agriculture, services and public procurement. Turkey is 
interested in the free movement of workers and the elimination of transportation 
quotas, transit visas and motor vehicle taxes. Another reason is the quest for eliminating 
trade defence measures.  
The institutional reasons are related to the flawed design and non-
implementation of the Ankara Agreement and Decision 1/95. Decision-making in the 
Association Council is cumbersome because of the unanimity rule, and other 
institutions of the association do not have significant decision-making powers but  
provide only a platform for the exchange of views.130 The consultation procedure is 
not implemented properly and the European Commission does not communicate its 
proposals to Turkey. In addition, the participation of Turkey in technical committees of 
the European Commission is limited. Lastly, there is no effective dispute settlement 
mechanism and Turkey does not observe EU case law. 
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The reasons of the modernization are more economic and institutional than 
political. Even the institutional reasons are intrinsically economic because they aim at 
increasing the economic benefits of the Customs Union by improving the institutional 
aspects. Turkey and the EU expect to achieve immediate economic benefits from an 
upgraded Customs Union. The political reasons, that is, the interests and policy choices 
of the EU and the political dynamics of Turkey-EU relations, rather determined the 
broader conjuncture which resulted in the consensus on modernizing the Customs 
Union. In other words, because of the stalemate of the accession negotiations, both 
sides seek to maximize their economic and institutional benefits through the 
modernization.  
The main concern of institutional modernization is to guarantee the 
simultaneous application of the EU acquis and enable Turkey’s participation in EU 
decision-making. Turkey and the EU seek to implement the consultation procedure. 
The participation of Turkey in all relevant technical committees of the European 
Commission is another issue on the agenda. The powers of the Customs Union Joint 
Committee should be upgraded in a way that all EU legislation relevant for the 
Customs Union should be incorporated into EU-Turkey association law. An effective 
dispute settlement mechanism should be established. The dialogue between the CJEU 
and Turkish courts should be developed for the observance by Turkey of EU case law. 
Lastly, for the elimination of trade defence measures, Turkey should align with the 
relevant EU acquis.131 
Preventing trade deflection from the EU’s FTAs is an important issue to deal with 
under substantial aspects. A good solution for this could be to make trade deflection 
reciprocal with the EU asking its FTA partners to open their markets to the Turkish goods 
until they conclude FTAs with Turkey.132 In addition, a modernized Customs Union may 
have provisions on horizontal issues like SPS rules, sustainable development, 
geographical indications, energy and raw materials, SMEs, capital movements or the 
protection of FDI.133 The extension to agriculture, services and public procurement 
could be achieved by separate agreements not including all agricultural goods or 
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services.134  Free movement of workers may be negotiated under Mode 4. Regarding 
public procurement, a modernized Customs Union may have provisions similar to the 
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement or “include further concessions in 
certain areas of coverage”.135 The elimination of transportation quotas, transit visas or 
motor vehicle taxes may be ensured by a ruling of the CJEU, if the Court adopts the 
opinion of the Advocate General. 
Transportation quotas and trade deflection, especially from TTIP, are the most 
cited reasons by Turkey for the modernization. Therefore, Turkey may have weaker 
incentives for modernizing the Customs Union in case the issue of transportation quotas 
is resolved by a ruling of the CJEU or the US Administration under President Trump finally 
calls the stalled TTIP negotiations off. Turkey has little if no influence on the EU 
institutions, norms and rules. It is rather a rule taker. Turkey’s interests are inevitably 
influenced by the interests of the EU because of its dependence on EU trade policy 
and the dependence of the accession process on unanimity.  
The modernization can also be framed as an attempt to compensate for the 
slowing down of the accession process. If Turkey was on the brink of joining the EU, the 
Customs Union would not have been modernized.136 The strategic aspect of EU-Turkey 
relations is strong because of their increased trade integration, common 
neighbourhood, foreign policy objectives of the EU and the regional role of Turkey. 
Their broader interests can be dealt with by either accession or tailor-made 
partnerships like the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 or cooperation through 
different platforms like the G20 or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  
The likely implications of the modernization of the Customs Union for the 
accession negotiations are twofold. If EU-Turkey relations improve, the modernization 
may serve as a further step for Turkey’s accession to the EU because of an increased 
socialization and harmonization of laws. Yet, it will most probably be the institutional 
basis for Turkey-EU relations in the near future. Although many argue that the 
modernization would be a further step towards membership in the longer term, some 
noted that in case accession does not happen, a modernized Customs Union will 
anchor Turkey more strongly to the EU.137  
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If the modernization is politicized in the sense of introducing conditions for 
politically sensitive issues in the mandate of the Council of the EU, it may not succeed. 
The politicization of the mandate and the failure of the modernization may distance 
Turkey even further from the EU. One of the reasons of the slowing down of the 
accession process is the lack of credibility, which discourages Turkey from complying 
with EU demands. Therefore, for the sake of the success of the modernization, 
politicization should be avoided. The EU should not approach the Customs Union as a 
platform for exerting political conditionality over Turkey and the political dialogue 
should be maintained within the accession process.  
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